(EASES) protocol for peer-to-peer massively multiplayer online games (P2P MMOGs). The authors declare that the EASES protocol is efficient and secure, and could achieve non-repudiation, event commitment, save memory, bandwidth and reduce the complexity of the computations. However, we find that Chan et al.'s EASES protocols are not secure and give the detailed steps to attack their protocol. Further, we point out their dynamic EASES protocol is also not secure and can be cracked by the attacker, the attacking result shows that attacker can even replace any update event he wants to forge. In 2010, Li et al. found a replay attack on the EASES protocol and proposed an enhanced edition to improve it. However, our works show their enhancement is still not secure as well. Finally, we made a discussion about this problem and point the weakness existence in these three protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiplayer on line games [1, 2] are a rapidly growing segment of Internet applications in the recent years. By providing more entertainment and sociability than singleplayer games, is fast becoming a major form of digital entertainment. In this kind of games, all players should connect with the server to send and receive event updates. An event update is cryptographic protocol by which a player generates an event message and sends it to the server for updating the game states. Traditional massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) [3] are conventional client-server models that do not scale with the number of simultaneous clients that need to be supported. To resolve conflicts in the simulation and act as a central repository for data, peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture [4, 5] is increasingly being considered as replacement for traditional client-server architecture in MMOGs. P2P MMOGs have many advantages over traditional clientserver systems due to their network connectivity and basic network services in a self-organizing manner. Whenever a player wants to play the finger-guessing game, an event message is sent to the server and the server processes all the events and updates the game states to ensure a global ordering for game executions and fair plays [6, 7] . However, P2P MMOGs communicate on the Internet raise the security issues such as cheating that a dishonest player can get valuable virtual items and even be sold for moneymaking. Recently, there are more and more efforts mounted to focus on event update protocols for online games in respect to the protection of sensitive communication and the provision of fair play.
In 2004, Dickey et al. [8] proposed a low latency and cheat-proof event ordering based on digital signatures and voting mechanism for P2P games. However, Corman et al. later show that Dickey et al.'s protocol is unable to prevent all cheats as claimed, and propose an improvement called secure event agreement protocol [9] , As digital signature requires a large amount of computations. To reduce heavyweight computations in every round of a game session, in 2008, Chan et al. [10] proposed an efficient and secure event signature (EASES) protocol using one-time signature with hash-chain key and claimed that their protocol has low computation and bandwidth costs, and is thus applicable to P2P-based MMOGs. Then they proposed a dynamic EASES protocol to avoid the pre-generation of hash-chain keys. Unfortunately, we find both the EASES protocol and the dynamic EASES protocol is not secure and attackers can easily forge a series of update event to replace the original one. In 2010, Li et al. [11] found a replay attack on the EASES protocol and suggested a simple enhanced edition. However, their enhanced protocol still suffered from our attack.
In this paper, we briefly review the EASES protocol, the dynamic EASES protocol, and the enhanced edition of the EASES protocol. Further, we introduce attacking methods to crack these protocols. Finally, we make a discussion on why our attack does.
II. REVIEW OF CHAN ET AL.'S EVENT SIGNATURE PROTOCOL FOR P2P MMOGS
The EASES protocol has four phases: the Initialization Phase, Signing Phase, Verification Phase, Reinitialization Phase. K will be used in the reverse order of their production during the subsequent rth rounds, where 0,1, 2,..., 1 r n = − . Figure 1 shows the production of hash-chain keys. 
A. Initialization Phase

B. Signing Phase
In this phase, if i P wants to submit event update messages to other online players in a game session with n rounds, he/she performs the following operations: 1. i P computes the 1st round one-time signature key figure 2 shows the singing process.
C. Verification Phase
In this phase, each online player j P receives the event update message
Δ from the player i P and performs the following operations:
1. In the first round, j P first verifies NewK NewK can be used after the (n+2)th rounds. The figure 3 shows the re-initialization process. 
, ,
Above attack is start from the first message. Actually, the attacker can start his attack from arbitrary round. Due to the protocol is for the peer-to-peer online games, short time delay won't cause other players find the existence of the attack.
IV. REVIEW OF THE DYNAMIC EASES
Dynamic EASES extends the "authentication via hashing" idea of the basic EASES be avoids the pregeneration of hash-chain keys. This helps to reduce memory usage. We achieve this by signing the messages without first preparing a series of hash-chain keys. The key point is to defer the revelation of committing key for two rounds. An adversary cannot intrude since he gets no knowledge about the committing key. As it is not necessary to initialize or re-initialize the hash-chain in the dynamic version, there are only two phases: signing and verification. 
A. Signing Phase
The player i 's out-going messages are summarized in the following equation: K in the rth round. But in dynamic EASES, the player ensures that the message of the (r-2)th round is correct by verifying the message received in the rth round.
V. HOW TO INTRUDE THE DYNAMIC EASES
The dynamic EASES protocol is very similar with the EASES protocol, thus one can easily get the attacking method to this protocol. We should high light that the first and the second messages can't be tempered, because the player's secret key sk is used to sign these messages. Thus attack can forge any message from the third one. Without lose the generality, we will describe how the attacker forges the rth message that player i sent to player j . The detailed steps are described as follows.
In the rth round, player i sends , which he received in the (r-2)th round. The attacker can intercept
− , and send it to the player j .
In the (r+1)th round, the attacker does not intercept the message from player i .
In the (r+2)th round, the attacker intercepts the message From this attack, we can see that attack not only can modify all messages from a selected round but also can modify the update event in some particular round. Hence, the dynamic protocol still does not achieve the original goal.
VI. REVIEW OF CHUN-TA LI ET AL.'S ENHANCED EVENT SIGNATURE PROTOCOL FOR P2P MMOGS
Li et al.'s enhanced EASES protocol also has four phases: the initialization phase, signing phase, verification phase, re-initialization phase.
A. Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase, player x P generates a series of one-time signature keys for a session and performs the following operations: ' s EASES, they found the EASES protocol easily suffered from the replay attack, and try to add a unique game number, "gno#", to solve this problem. Unfortunately, the problem they found is not the main issue, thus attacker can crack the enhanced protocol in the similar way. The detailed steps are described as follows: 
